

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0964/01 3081655
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041655Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9943
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5226
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2403
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1410
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6599

S E C R E T GENEVA 000964

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING/LUNCH,
OCTOBER 27, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0856 (SFO-GVA-V-044)
[1](#)B. GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007)
[1](#)C. GENEVA 0951 (SFO-GVA-VI-024)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-031.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2009
Time: 11:30 A.M. - 1:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) During the October 27 meeting of the Conversion or Elimination (Core) Working Group, the Russian side provided and reviewed, in detail, a revised Russian proposal for the draft Treaty Article VII, on Core. It also provided and reviewed a revised version of its proposed Annex Section III, Procedures for Conversion or Elimination. The U.S. side provided and presented a revised U.S. proposal for General Provisions for Section III, responding to an earlier proposal by the Russian side to economize text that appeared repeatedly throughout the Core Section. The presentations continued to show similarities between the Russian and U.S. texts. A fundamental difference remained concerning mobile ICBMs, launch canisters for mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs. The Russian side strenuously objected to the U.S. requirement to observe the elimination process for mobile

ICBMs and their launchers. The Russian side opined that this requirement was expensive and unnecessary, and risked rejection by the Russian parliament.

¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: A Continued Push to Reduce Core Text; U.S. View of General Provisions; and, Continued Russian Sensitivities Concerning Mobile Missiles and Their Launchers.

A CONTINUED PUSH
TO REDUCE CORE TEXT

¶5. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov began the third meeting of the Core Working Group for this session with a presentation of revised Russian-proposed texts for Treaty Article VII and Section III of the Annex. He commented that both sides were working to place general Core provisions at the beginning of Section III. He emphasized that the Russian and U.S. approaches were similar, with certain exceptions.

¶6. (S) Ryzhkov first reviewed the similarities and differences between the original U.S.- and Russian-proposed texts of Article VII (REFS A and B). He highlighted four points where the Russians disagreed with the U.S. approach or had decided to change their own position:

-- In the first paragraph, on discussion of general Core procedures, the United States referred to fixed structures for mobile launchers. Russia proposed to refer to fixed structures in the facility elimination subsection of its

Annex.

-- Russia's paragraph 2 of Article VII was like the U.S. paragraphs 3 and 4. These paragraphs described the period during which strategic offensive arms remained subject to the treaty--they dealt with accountability. Russia proposed moving the provisions on when items were removed from accountability Article VII to Article III of the treaty, so that all provisions relating to accountability would be together. As an aside, Ryzhkov also commented that Russia had failed to mention how Russia planned to treat ground trainers. He said that Russia agreed with the United States, that is, such items would not be subject to the treaty.

-- Russian paragraph 3 of Article VII, provisions pertaining to use of ICBMs or SLBMs to place a payload in space or the upper atmosphere, was not in the U.S. text. Russia believed this provision should be moved into Article V of the treaty, because it was a prohibition. (Begin comment: On delivering a weapon into space. End comment.)

-- The U.S. and Russian paragraph 4 of Article VII specified where Core could be carried out. Russia wanted the flexibility to conduct Core at any facility, not just at Core facilities.

¶7. (S) Ryzhkov related that the Russian Delegation had decided Article VII could be reduced down to two paragraphs.

¶8. (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed text of Article VII, provided October 27, 2009):

Official Translation

October 27, 2009

Article VII

¶1. Conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms, as well as the facilities where they are located, shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section III of the Annex to this Treaty.

¶2. Verification of the completion by the Parties of the

conversion or elimination procedures for strategic offensive arms and the facilities where they are located shall be carried out:

a) by national technical means of verification;

b) by provision of notifications;

c) by inspections, which may be carried out by the inspecting Party upon the completion of conversion or elimination procedures.

End text.

¶9. (S) Ryzhkov noted one difference in the U.S. and Russian views; Russia viewed the exchange of notifications to be one method of verification, in the broad sense. In certain situations of removal from accountability, such as accidental

loss, e.g., a submarine sank, a notification was the only procedure existing. The Russian Federation also strongly objected to inspections conducted during elimination procedures. They were not consistent with the goal of making CorE simpler and less costly, and were more than what was necessary. They probably would not be accepted by the Russian parliament. Ryzhkov then presented Russia's revised text for Article VII to Elliott in Russian.

¶10. (S) Ryzhkov reviewed his "General Provisions" chapeau from the Russian proposal for "Section III Conversion or Elimination Procedures." Ryzhkov stated that the General Provisions section captured provisions and notifications that were repeated throughout the various sections of both U.S. and Russian texts.

Begin text:

Official Translation

Document of the Russian side
October 27, 2009

Draft

Section III Conversion or Elimination Procedures

Pursuant to and in implementation of this Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conversion or elimination of the strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty, as well as facilities at which they are located.

¶I. General Provisions

¶1. Notifications, regarding the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms limited by this treaty, shall be sent in accordance with Section IV, subsection IV of the Annex to this Treaty.

¶2. Conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty shall be carried out at a location, chosen by the Party conducting the elimination or conversion.

¶3. Conversion of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty shall be carried out in such a manner so as to preclude their use for their original purpose. As part of this conversion, the converted item must have either external or functional differences from the item prior to its conversion. The converting Party shall notify the other Party about these differences. The elimination of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty and of facilities must be conducted in such a manner so as to render them inoperable and preclude their use for their original purpose. The procedures, which shall be used for conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty and facilities, must achieve the goals set forth in this paragraph.

¶4. If a Party conducts conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty using procedures which it developed, then the Party shall notify the other Party about these procedures in accordance with

section IV, subsection IV, paragraph (X) of the Annex to this Treaty. If, in the opinion of the other Party, the procedures developed by the Party conducting the conversion or elimination do not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 3 of this subsection, those procedures shall be discussed within the framework of the BCC. In such a case, the Party, conducting the conversion or elimination, shall conduct a demonstration of the procedures, which it developed, within the framework of the BCC. The procedures, discussed by the Parties within the framework of the BCC, shall be used thereafter during elimination or conversion of the same strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty. In this case, the Party, which received notification from the Party conducting the conversion or elimination about the use of such discussed procedures, shall not object to their use.

¶5. After completion of conversion of an item of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty into another item of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty or of an item of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty into an item other than an item of strategic offensive arms, the converting Party shall conduct a demonstration in accordance with paragraph (X) of Article XI of this Treaty.

¶6. The conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms limited by this Treaty, as well as of facilities, may be verified by an inspection team during inspection activities in accordance with paragraph (X) of Article XI of this Treaty.

End text.

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov stated that, since the Russian side had moved a large amount of text into the General Provisions section, all other sections had changed. He then provided an updated version of the Russian text to Mr. Elliott in Russian. Elliott confirmed that Ryzhkov had provided a revised Section III, including General Provisions, and a revised Article VII of the treaty. Elliott noted that he had been prepared to hand over a joint draft text (JDT) for Section III, based on the Russian text from Friday, October 23 (REF C), but that it appeared best to translate the new Russian products, and then create a revised JDT.

U.S. VIEW OF GENERAL PROVISIONS

¶12. (S) Elliott presented the U.S.-proposed text for the General Provisions section of the CorE Annex.

Begin text:

SFO-VI
U.S.-Proposed Text
October 27, 2009

General Provisions Section of the CorE Annex

¶1. Conversion or elimination shall be carried out at declared facilities and shall be subject to verification by national technical means or by inspection, as applicable.

¶2. The Party carrying out conversion or elimination shall

provide notification in accordance with subsection XXX of Section XXX of this Annex.

¶3. If an inspection is conducted, a report shall be completed in accordance with paragraph XXX of subsection XXX of Section XXX of this Annex.

¶4. Upon completion of elimination, the eliminated item shall cease to be subject to the limitations of the Treaty.

¶5. Upon completion of conversion, the converted item may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

End text.

¶13. (S) Elliott sought clarification on topics to discuss in the next working group meeting. Both sides agreed that General Provisions and Treaty Article VII would be discussed.

Elliott requested that, if time permitted, joint text on the elimination of facilities be discussed. He noted there remained confusion as to how Russia treated the Core of mobile missiles and mobile launchers.

CONTINUED RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES
CONCERNING MOBILE MISSILES AND
THEIR LAUNCHERS

¶14. (S) Ryzhkov's mood hardened while he lectured the working group on Russia's opposition to the inspection of mobile missile eliminations. He repeated Russian opposition to the inspections, citing cost and logistical burdens. Mr. Smirnov emphasized that the bottom line was verifying the elimination of the missiles, not the process of elimination, and questioned "should we observe the process or confirm the fact?" Smirnov opined that American submarines posed a much greater threat than Russian missiles on mobile launchers. At the end of the mobile missile monologue, Ryzhkov acknowledged that a decision on mobiles needed to be made at the highest levels so that the negotiations could move forward. Elliott agreed. Col Zaitsev launched one final salvo on the cost of Core inspections and again stated that the U.S. position on mobiles was detrimental to the process. Both Ryzhkov and Elliott agreed that the issue had to be resolved at the highest level and that, for now, both sides would have to remain within their respective guidance on the mobile issue.

¶15. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Language for General Provisions Section of the Core Annex, dated October 27, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Revised version of Russian-proposed Treaty Article VII Conversion or Elimination, dated October 27, 2009; and

-- Revised version of Russian Section III of the Annex to the draft Treaty: Procedures For Conversion or Elimination,

dated October 27, 2009.

¶16. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
LCDR Brons
Mr. Brown
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Mr. Strauss
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Leontiev
Ms. Melikbekyan
Mr. Smirnov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶17. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS